l8r Twats Library

@wilderko

Post

We won’t be able to avoid Chat Control and government/corporate surveillance in the future.

But we can render that surveillance worthless.

A censor’s database is only valuable if what’s in it actually means something.

An AI agent nullifies the evidentiary value of everything they’ve collected about you.

Let’s contaminate the censors!

The new privacy rule for the AI era is:

Any intercepted communication must always be AI-generated.

https://contaminatecensors.org/

In the coming weeks, I’ll be publishing a set of AI prompts on https://notme.chat/ that will replace all of your (Chat Control) potentially spied-on communications with AI agents who will explain to your friends and acquaintances that they can only reach you via a secure messenger.

If it’s not end-to-end encrypted, it’s not you.

Explanation

What it says Pavol Lupták argues that future surveillance may be unavoidable, but its informational value can be sabotaged. His proposal: make every non-end-to-end-encrypted communication AI-generated, so intercepted messages no longer reliably represent what the person actually said or intended. He plans prompts/agents that would answer on insecure channels by directing contacts to a secure messenger.

Context This is an adversarial privacy idea aimed at “Chat Control” and broader government/corporate surveillance. The key concept is not secrecy but data poisoning / plausible deniability: if surveillance systems cannot distinguish authentic human communications from automated synthetic traffic, their databases become less trustworthy as evidence or behavioral records.

Why it matters The interesting inversion is: rather than trying only to prevent collection, deliberately reduce the epistemic value of what gets collected. That could matter if widespread AI agents make authorship increasingly ambiguous. But the post does not establish that AI-generated traffic would actually destroy evidentiary value; metadata, authentication, device logs, behavioral patterns, and surrounding evidence could still attribute communications. The concrete implementation and threat model are mostly missing, so the idea is more provocative strategy than demonstrated privacy system.